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Abstract 
WALKER PERCY'S THE MOVIEGOER AS CHRISTIAN APOLOGETIC 
Jon A. Pirtle IV, M.A. 
Western Carolina University, December 2005 
Director: Dr. James Byer 
This thesis examines the existential despair and loss of meaning found in Camus' 
The Stranger and Sartre's No Exit, and then compares and contrasts those qualities with 
the Christian worldview and apologetic found in Percy's The Moviegoer. 
The first chapter is an exegesis of Camus' The Stranger wherein I relate how the 
loss of meaning accompanies the denial of a transcendent creator. 
The second chapter explains how Sartre's No Exit likewise denies the existence of 
a transcendent creator and how this denial creates existential hell for the characters. 
The third chapter compares and contrasts Percy's The Moviegoer with Camus' 
novel and Sartre's play. Specifically, I show how Percy's Christian worldview in the 
novel is an alternative to the atheistic worldview put forth by Camus and Sartre. 
The fourth chapter examines the '"horizontal search" that manifests itself in the 
life ofBinx Bolling, the protagonist of Percy's The Moviegoer. This horizontal search is 
predicated on a Christian worldview. 
IV 
Introduction 
A Background of Atheistic Existentialism 
The works of Walker Percy (1916-90) have been cited by novelists, biographers, 
linguists, psychologists, Catholics, Protestants, atheists, semioticists, et al. for his myriad 
contributions to contemporary thought and literature. Each group has noted some ideas in 
Percy's thought that merit attention because of their relevance in explaining modem 
man's alienation and purposelessness. Despite the variety of thinkers that have cited 
Percy for ideas appropriate for their views, however, Percy belongs firmly in the line of 
Christian thinkers and writers-including Dostoyevsky and C.S. Lewis. In the following 
pages I attempt to show how Percy rejects the philosophy of atheistic existentialism 
found in Albert Camus' novel The Stranger and in Jean Paul Sartre's play No Exit by 
explicating Percy's novel The Moviegoer as counterpoint. In addition to The Moviegoer, 
I borrow heavily from other Percy novels as well as from his nonfiction works. I show 
how Percy's thought parallels that ofDostoyevsky and C.S. Lewis in an effort to show 
how Percy's ideas starkly contrast with the atheistic existentialism that is presupposed in 
Camus' novel and Sartre's play. 
Much of modem and postmodem fiction has been characterized as literature of 
despair, angst, malaise, and even silence. The plays and novels of Samuel Beckett, for 
example, often are set in an "absurd" universe wherein the characters while away their 
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time until physical death ends their daily metaphysical death experience. Walker Percy 
wrote in "Diagnosing the Modem Malaise": 
... the community of discourse in the current novel might be likened to 
two prisoners who find themselves in adjoining cells as a consequence of 
some vague Kafka-like offense. Communication is possible by tapping 
against the intervening wall. Do they speak the same language? The quasi-
conversations or nonconversations might be found in novels and plays 
from Kafka to Sartre to Beckett to Pinter to Joseph McElroy. (217) 
In his diagnosis of the modem malaise, Percy has put his finger on the 
philosophical nihilism of much modem and postmodern literature. The state of ideas of 
the modernist and postmodernist is replete with moral relativism. In Jesus Among Other 
Gods, Ravi Zacharias describes the condition this way: 
Philosophically, you can believe anything, so long as you do not claim it 
to be true. Morally, you can practice anything, so long as you do not claim 
that it is a "better" way. Religiously, you can hold to anything, so long as 
you do not bring Jesus Christ into it. If a spiritual idea is eastern, it is 
granted critical immunity; if western, it is thoroughly criticized. Thus, a 
j oumalist can walk into a church and mock its carrying on, but he or she 
dare not do the same if the ceremony is from the eastern fold. Such is the 
mood at the end of the twentieth century. (7) 
The background of postmodernism from which Percy emerges, and to which 
Percy objects, is one wherein Truth (with a capital T) has disappeared and people are 
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reduced to uttering truths without any unifying principle of objective Truth. There is 
your truth and my truth, in other words, but no such thing as The Truth exists. In making 
the statement that there is no objective truth, however, one has posited a statement of 
truth (an either/or statement). To say that there are no moral absolutes is to make an 
absolute statement. If it is true that there are no absolutes, for example, then the statement 
that "there are no absolutes" cannot be true. This is indicative of the circular thinking that 
pervades postmodernism. Norm Geisler and Frank Turek address this philosophical 
duplicity found in postmodernism in their book I Don't Have Enough Faith to Be an 
Atheist: 
Relativists usually make two primary truth claims: 1) there is no absolute 
truth; and 2) there are no absolute moral values ... ifthere really is no 
absolute truth, then their absolute claim that "there is no absolute truth" 
can't be true. You can see that the relativisfs statement is irrational 
because it affirms exactly what he's trying to deny. (172) 
As we will see, this is one of the philosophical difficulties that Percy addresses implicitly 
in his fiction and explicitly in his nonfiction. 
The malaise that pervades Camus' The Stranger and Sartre's No Exit is not 
accidental; rather it follows from the authors' presuppositions of atheism. The reason that 
Meursault in The Stranger resembles a pinball in a machine more than a man filled with a 
sense of purpose is because he is devoid of "calling" or transcendental meaning. Like 
Beckett's characters in Waiting for Godot, Meursault whiles away his time and commits 
"meaningless" acts because there is no transcendent meaning in his life or in anyone 
else's beyond that which he ascribes to it. In grappling with this theme of 
purposelessness in modem and postmodem literature as seen in The Stranger and No 
Exit, Ravi Zacharias writes the following in the book Can Man Live Without God?: 
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I hold the view that all philosophizing oflife's purpose is ultimately 
founded upon two fundamental assumptions or conclusions. The first is, 
Does God exist? And the second, If God exists, what is His chamcter or 
nature? The questions are impossible to ignore, and even if they are not 
dealt with fonnally, their implications filter down in to everyday life. It is 
out of one's belief or disbelief in God that all other convictions are 
fonned. (8) 
At the root of the despair in Camus' The Stranger and Sartre's No Exit is the 
authors' atheism. The result is meaninglessness and despair in an absurd universe. As 
Ivan's Grand Inquisitor says in Dostoyevsky's The Brothers Karamazov, "If God doesn't 
exist, everything is pennissible" (243). In The Myth of Sisyphus, Camus argued that if 
God is dead, then "there is only one truly philosophical problem, and that is suicide. 
Judging whether life is or is not worth living amounts to answering the fundamental 
question of philosophy" (12). 
It is a natural extension, then, of Camus' and Sartre's atheism to create chamcters 
in their literary works who are in despair and whose actions are perfonned lethargically. 
In The Stranger Meursault acts in a defeatist manner throughout the story-almost as if 
he knows the game is up and he loses. Nothing he does is passionate; rather, he is 
dispassionate and enervated in manner and deed. His life is spent in torpor. Like 
Beckett's characters, he taps out sounds with no hopes of their being answered. 
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One of the results of postmodernism' s atheism and absence of absolutes is a 
corresponding loss of meaning and value. A contemporary of Camus and Sartre, Francis 
Schaeffer, takes issue with Sartre and Camus and their philosophical atheism and the 
effect that it has on modern man's sense of meaninglessness. In his book How Should We 
Then Live? Schaeffer writes: 
What will unify and give meaning to everything there is? Jean-Paul Sartre 
(1905-80), the French existential philosopher, emphasized this problem in 
our own generation. His concept was that a finite point is absurd if it has 
no infinite reference point. This concept is most easily understood in the 
area of morals. If there is no absolute moral standard, then one cannot say 
in a final sense that anything is right or wrong. By absolute we mean that 
which always applies, that which provides a final or ultimate standard. 
There must be an absolute if there are to be morals, and there must be an 
absolute ifthere are to be real values. Ifthere is no absolute beyond man's 
ideas, then there is no final appeal to judge between individuals and 
groups whose moraIjudgments conflict. We are merely left with 
conflicting opinions. 
But it is not only that we need absolutes in morals and values; we need 
absolutes if our existence is to have meaning-my existence, your 
existence, Man's existence. Even more profoundly, we must have 
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absolutes if we are to have a solid epistemology (a theory of knowing-
how we know, or how we know we know). How can we be sure that what 
we think we know of the world outside ourselves really corresponds to 
what is there? And in all these layers, each more profound than the other, 
unless there is an absolute these things are lost to us: morals, values, the 
meaning of existence (including the meaning of man), and a basis for 
knowing. (145) 
In his essay "The State of the Novel: Dying Art or New Science," Percy explicitly 
addresses these same issues of lostness: 
Indeed, the twentieth-century novel might be set forth as one or another 
aspect of disenchantment ranging from the gentle disillusion of the 
Marquand character to the derisive wise-acre disgust of Bob Slocum, with 
stopovers at the restiveness of the Hemingway expatriate, the 
metaphysical anxiety of the European existentialists, the apathy of Camus' 
Meursault, the rampaging gallows humor of a Portnoy. Someone has in 
fact characterized the change in direction of the great body of poetry and 
fiction for the past hundred years as the Great Literary Secession, meaning 
that poets and novelists have, for whatever reason, registered a massive 
dissent from the modem proposition that, with the advance of science and 
technology and education, life gets better, too. This issue, I would 
suppose, must sooner or later be confronted by anyone, scientist or artist 
or layman, interested in trying to figure out how things are and how to 
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make life more tolerable both for oneself and for other people. Do we not 
indeed have the sense that the question grows daily more urgent? That 
there is a cumulative sense of crisis which allows us less and less room for 
temporizing? Something has happened, all right. But perhaps something 
worse is about to happen. (144-145) 
Percy does not suggest that science is to blame for man's malaise; science has 
undoubtedly led to improvements in the quality of life. However, to say that science 
answers questions of meaning and purposelessness is altogether another matter. Percy has 
a Christian worldview; namely, that by recognizing and accepting the payment for Man's 
sin through the substitutionary death of Christ, Man can be reunited with God and 
thereby achieve transcendent meaning. Without this Christian worldview, however, Percy 
would undoubtedly agree that Man is "lost in the cosmos" (Percy's phrase). 
Percy's Christian worldview should be seen as a reaction to the philosophy of the 
Danish philosopher Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855). Percy was emphatic in his views of 
Kierkegaard's work. Moreover, Percy refers to Kierkegaard often in his nonfiction and 
philosophical essays. In his essay "Diagnosing the Modem Malaise," Percy writes: 
Christendom began to crumble, perhaps most noticeably under the onslaught 
of a Christian, Soren Kierkegaard, in the last century. Again I am not telling you 
anything new when I suggest that the Christian notion of man as a wayfarer in 
search of his salvation no longer informs Western culture. In its place, what most 
ofus seem to be seeking are such familiar goals as maturity, creativity, autonomy, 
rewarding interpersonal relations, and so forth. 
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To speak of the decay of Christendom is to say nothing of the ultimate truth of 
Christianity, but only to call attention to a cultural phenomenon and the symbols 
with which it was conveyed. What concerns us here is that, from the perspective 
of the novelist, literary attempts to revive traditional expressions of Christendom 
are seldom undertaken anymore. Even when they were, it was often with the 
sense of a nostalgic revival of a way of life, or else undertaken with the skill of a 
great novelist in portraying a belief which he did not necessarily subscribe to. I 
am thinking in particular of the Southern Agrarians and of Faulkner's Dilsey. But 
most contemporary novelists have moved on into a world of rootless and isolated 
consciousnesses for whom not even the memory and the nostalgia exist. As Lewis 
Simpson put it: "The covenant with memory and history has been abrogated in 
favor of the existential self." (207-208) 
Chapter I 
Camus' The Stranger and Existential Despair 
The comparing of Camus' The Stranger and Percy's The Moviegoer is nothing 
new. Each novel deals with existential angst; each novel grapples with metaphysical 
questions of ultimate reality; and each novel offers an answer to the question of whether 
life is worth living and, ifit is, under what, if any, moral code. There are many more 
similarities between the two novels, as we shall see, especially in the realm of existential 
loneliness, sexual "re-entry" (percy's term), and violence, but my purpose here is to show 
how each writer took a different path in addressing these issues. 
It must be noted that Camus wrote the novel in the 1940s and his philosophical 
training as a student and young intellectual was that ofa Western worldview; as such, 
when I refer to Camus' denial of God in the following pages, I mean to signify the God 
of Christianity as it has been "traditionally" understood in its broadest sense. Specifically, 
I refer to the belief that God is triune in nature (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit). The Father 
is spirit; Jesus Christ is the spirit revealed in the flesh through the Incarnation; and the 
Holy Spirit is the means by which God communicates to those open to receive Him. In 
Mere Christianity, C.S. Lewis gives this example: 
An ordinary simple Christian kneels down to say his prayers. He is trying 
to get in touch with God. But if he is a Christian he knows that what is 
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prompting him to pray is also God: God, so to speak, inside him. But he 
also knows that all his real knowledge of God comes through Christ, the 
Man who was God--that Christ is standing beside him, helping him to 
pray, praying for him. You see what is happening. God is the thing to 
which he is praying--the goal he is trying to reach. God is also the thing 
inside him which is pushing him on-the motive power. God is also the 
road or bridge along which he is being pushed to that goal. So that the 
whole threefold life of the three-personal Being is actually going on in 
that ordinary little bedroom where an ordinary man is saying his prayers. 
The man is being caught up into the higher kinds of life-what I called Zoe 
or spiritual life: he is being pulled into God, by God, while still remaining 
himself. (163) 
Meursault, the protagonist of Camus' novel The Stranger, follows a path of 
existential loneliness and despair. The Stranger serves as a watershed book in terms of its 
expression of existential despair in a world void of transcendent meaning and of belief in 
a transcendent and Holy God. It is the story of a bachelor named Meursault who lives an 
uneventful1ife. He has few, if any, hobbies. He works as a shipping clerk in Algeria in 
the 1940s and he lives in an apartment that is sparsely furnished, resembling, in fact, a 
hotel room. The very sparseness of Meursault's room reflects the sparseness of his life 
and can be seen as a metaphor for the absence of meaning in his life. This is one of the 
reasons Meursault "distracts" himself via myriad women, sleeping, eating, etc.-to 
excess. My intention here is not to disparage The Stranger; on the contrary, I think its 
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literary merits are significant, especially as they personify the existential despair that 
pervades much of modem and postrnodem literature. It is noteworthy, however, that 
Camus' Meursault personifies a modem day everyman who rejects belief in God and who 
alienates himself from other people. His atheism, his alienation, and his tragic end are 
inextricably linked. How Meursault's beliefs and attitudes influence his actions reveal 
much, I think, of Camus' own philosophy. 
Instead of enjoying women or even more unimaginably in Meursault's world, one 
woman, within a sanctified union of marriage, he engages in sexual intercourse with little 
thought of its significance or appropriateness. He decontextualizes sex so that it serves as 
little more than a distraction from despair. Sartre, Kierkegaard, and even Percy would call 
this behavior "inauthenticity" or "bad faith" (Sartre's term). The major difference 
between the aforementioned and Percy (and Kierkegaard to some degree) is that Percy 
contends that there is an objective standard (God) by which humanity is measured. 
Anything less than transcendence renders the alternatives subjective and relative. This is 
what Ravi Zacharias meant in the above quote when he said that all philosophizing of 
life's purpose presupposes a response to the questions of God's existence or non-
existence and, if He does exist, His nature. 
Meursault also spends an overwhelming amount of time sleeping. It, too, serves to 
distract him from thinking about his life. Stated another way, it insulates him. It removes, 
or at least mitigates, the possibility of his realizing his own "everydayness" (percy's 
term) and despair. 
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For the purposes of this paper the meaning of despair should be viewed through a 
Kierkegaardian lens. Perhaps a quote from Kierkegaard's Edifying Discourses in Various 
Spirits may illustrate the condition and predicament of despair: 
Now, willing one thing does not mean to commit the grave mistake of a 
brazen, unholy enthusiasm, namely to will the big, no matter whether it be 
good or bad. Also, one who wills in this fashion, no matter how 
desperately he does it, is indeed double-minded. Is not despair simply 
double-mindedness? For what is despairing other than to have two wills? 
For whether the weakling despairs over not being able to wrench himself 
away from the bad, or whether the brazen one despairs over not being able 
to tear himself completely away from the Good--they are both double-
minded, they both have two wills. Neither of them honestly wills 
one thing, however desperately they may seem to will it. Whether it was a 
woman, whom desire brought to desperation, or whether it was a man who 
despaired in defiance; whether a man despaired because he got his win or 
wills, one that he fruitlessly tries wholly to follow and one that he 
fruitlessly tries to avoid. In this fashion has God, better than any king, 
insured himself against every rebellion? But each rebel against God, in the 
last instance, is himself reduced to despair. Despair is the limit--"here and 
no further!" despair is the limit. Here are met the cowardly, timorous ill-
temper of self-love, and the proud defiant presumption of the mind--here 
they are met in equal impotence. (207-208) 
13 
Briefly stated, then, despair is double-mindedness. The apostle James wrote, "A 
double-minded man is unstable in all his ways" (James 1 :8, NIV). 
Camus' Meursault embodies double-mindedness. He is, in some regards, his own 
worst enemy regarding his unwillingness to break out of his apathy and lassitude. The 
Stranger is replete with scenes of Meursault being on the edge of a metaphysical 
breakthrough into meaning, but instead of that occurring, he reverts to mindless 
distractions. In the following scene, for example, Meursault recounts some of the events 
on the day of his mother's funeral: 
And I can remember the look of the church, the villagers in the street, the 
red geraniums on the graves, Perez's fainting fit-he crumpled up like a rag 
doll--the tawny--red earth pattering on Mother's coffin, the bits of white 
roots mixed up with it; then more people, voices, the wait outside a cafe 
for the bus, the rumble of the engine, and my little thrill of pleasure when 
we entered the first brightly lit streets of Algiers, and I pictured myself 
going straight to bed and sleeping twelve hours at a stretch. (22) 
Rather than meditating on the loss of his mother, his most poignant moments of that day 
are of his longing for sleep. Arguably, a less estranged person would give more thought 
to the sadness of his mother's death; Meursault, however, is all but unaffected. 
Meursault passes his time through mild amusements and distraction: 
Getting up was an effort, as I'd been really exhausted by the previous 
day's experiences. While shaving, I wondered how to spend the morning, 
and decided that a swim would do me good. So I caught the streetcar that 
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goes down to the harbor. It was quite like old times; a lot of young people 
were in the swimming pool, amongst them Marie Cardona, who used to be 
a typist at the office. I was rather keen on her in those days, and I fancy 
she liked me, too. But she was with us so short a time that nothing came of 
it. 
While I was helping her to climb on to a raft, I let my hand stray over 
her breasts. Then she lay flat on the raft, while I trod water. After a 
moment she turned and looked at me. Her hair was over her eyes and she 
was laughing. I clambered up on to the raft, beside her. The air was 
pleasantly warm, and, half jokingly, I let my head sink back upon her lap. 
She didn't seem to mind, so I let it stay there. (23) 
In his book Youthful Writings, Camus wrote the following entry entitled 
"Contradictions" in 1933. These thoughts reveal themes that would occupy all of his later 
fiction and nonfiction writing: 
Accept life, take it as it is? Stupid. The means of doing otherwise? Far 
from your having to take it, it is life that possesses us and on occasion 
shuts our mouths. 
Accept the human condition? I believe that, on the contrary, revolt is part 
of human nature. 
To pretend to accept what is imposed on us is a sinister comedy. First of 
all we must live. So many things are capable of being loved that it is 
ridiculous to seem to desire pain. 
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Comedy. Pretense. One must be sincere. Sincere at any price, even to our 
own detriment. 
Neither revolt nor despair, moreover. Life with what it has. To accept it or 
revolt against it is to place oneself in opposition to life. Pure illusion. We 
are in life. It strikes us, mutilates us, spits in our face. It also illuminates us 
with crazy and sudden happiness that makes us participants. It is short. 
That is enough. Still, make no mistake: there is pain. Impossible to evade. 
Perhaps, deep within ourselves, life's essential lot. (210) 
This diary-like entry into one of Camus' journals reveals, I think, much of 
Camus' attitude and philosophy; namely, that man's life is tragic. For Camus, man's 
freedom is his fundamental characteristic. This freedom is thrust upon man and he is, to 
use Sartre's phrase, "condemned to be free." When Camus writes that pain is impossible 
to evade, it is because man must choose. It is this inescapability that brings to mind 
Eliot's Prufrock and Shakespeare's Hamlet or even Faulkner's Darl Bundren or Heller's 
y ossarian. In similar ways, these men are all pierced with anxiety that arises when having 
to choose. Their suffering is due to their sensitivity in engaging or withdrawing from 
choice. In having to choose, each of them is paralyzed with doubt and despair. Camus 
suggests that each man's fundamental choice is either to endure the pain that is his lot or 
to succumb to despair. One of the problems of Camus' thinking, however, is how to 
anchor moral choices to an objective standard (God). His answer seems flawed in this 
regard; namely, without recognizing God as the transcendent embodiment of Truth, 
Good, and Beauty, one cannot anchor morality. Man becomes the arbiter of right and 
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wrong; and, in the Christian schema, this was and is man's greatest sin: He rebelled 
against God and became, as it were, the god of God. In so doing, he lost his designed 
purpose and identity. For the Christian, man's designed purpose is to live a life that 
brings honor and glory to God. Apart from the designed relationship, man wanders at his 
own peril until he recognizes his own rebellion and sinfulness. Admittedly, Camus 
suggests that rebellion is a temporary stay against despair, not a remedy to it. Is Camus, 
however, being intellectually honest and "sincere at any price" as he suggests? 
St. Augustine writes in The Confessions, "thou hast made us for thyself and 
restless is our heart until it comes to rest in thee" (5). This is why Camus sees Sisyphus as 
a paragon for modem man. Universal Man (like Sisyphus) is condemned to perform this 
absurd play. For Camus, modern man is condemned in that he arrives upon life's stage 
without a script. Life's play is absurd in that man's actions and meaning can never be 
anything more than subjective; they do not have eternal or cosmic significance. Like 
Sisyphus rolling his rock to the top of the hill only to have it roll down again, man is free 
to rebel, yes, but his choices are ultimately meaningless. For Camus, Sisyphus (modern 
man) is not inherently valuable or sacred; rather he personifies man's futility. He, like 
modern man, can endure his lot or commit suicide. 
Camus' philosophy colors his portrayal of Meursault in The Stranger. 
Meursault's universe, like Camus', is devoid of absolute values. By the end of the novel, 
it is obvious that Meursault is a nihilist. He commits a senseless murder and shows no 
remorse for it. He resembles Dostoyevsky's characters--the "underground man" or 
Raskolnikov, who does show remorse in Crime and Punishment The main difference 
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between Meursault and Dostoyevsky's protagonists is that Meursault murders not for a 
philosophical value but from its absence; hence, his nihilism. Meursault's nihilism is 
paradoxical. He, like Camus, rejects God; yet he wants to posit his rebellion as a value. 
David Sprintzen writes of this absurdity in Camus: A Critical Examination: 
In the world revealed by the absurd, creation is gratuitous effort. Lacking 
an ultimate scale of values, art can have no precedence over ditch-digging. 
The salient question is this: Does a specific work of art assist in bringing 
into awareness a lucid consciousness that-in an attitude of complete 
indifference to ultimate questions-can exhaust that qualities of the 
present? AIl of Camus' heroes of the absurd were such because they were 
aware that their endeavors lacked any ultimate justification. The 
exemplary role of the creator arises solely from the fact that new things 
are brought into an existence without justification. In a task in which the 
temptation toward justification is perhaps strongest, the absurd creator 
refuses to give in. Knowing these works are gratuitous, the artist embodies 
this knowledge in them. (231-232) 
After Meursault murders and rejects contrition, Camus describes Meursault's 
inner feelings: 
It was as if that great rush of anger had washed me clean, emptied me of 
hope, and gazing up at the dark sky spangled with its signs and stars, for 
the first time, the first, I laid my heart open to the benign indifference of 
the universe. (154) 
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In this passage, Camus seems to suggest that Meursault's life will be better now 
that he has been emptied of hope. Outside of God, it is impossible to anchor statements of 
value. One can have "preferences"; but to imply that being "emptied of hope" is 
somehow better begs the question of how Meursault's resignation is morally better that 
any other choice. I think Camus' philosophy (and Meursault's) is one of resignation, not 
rebellion. The opening of The Stranger illustrates Meursault's attitude: 
Mother died today. Or, maybe, yesterday; I can't be sure. The telegram 
from the Home says: YOUR MOTHER PASSED A WA Y, FUNERAL 
TOMORROW. DEEP SYMPATHY. Which leaves the matter doubtful; it 
could have been yesterday. (1) 
This opening is one of the most haunting in modern literature because we feel 
Meursault's despair. Here is a man totally estranged from his world; and his despair is 
palpable. That Meursault is the first person narrator of The Stranger augments our ability 
to sympathize with him despite his being an anti-hero. Traditionally. we would expect a 
character to be saddened by the death of his mother. But Camus turns our expected or 
traditional reaction on its head. Meursault is somehow removed from the world and one's 
emotional reactions to it. He evades an emotional commitment to his mother's death. 
Upon hearing of his mother's death, Meursault readies himself to attend her 
funeral. He takes a bus to "The Home" where his mother has lived for three years and he 
is addressed by the warden of the retirement home. Somewhat piqued by the warden's 
tone and the implication that he is not a compassionate son, Meursault recounts silently to 
himself this interior monologue of his relationship with his mother years before: 
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That was so. When we lived together, Mother was always watching me, 
but we hardly ever talked. During her fIrst few weeks at the Home she 
used to cry a good deal. But that was only because she hadn't settled 
down. After a month or two she'd have cried if she'd been told to leave 
the Home. Because this, too, would have been a wrench. That was why, 
during the last year, I seldom went to see her. Also, it would have meant 
losing my Sunday--not to mention the trouble of going to the bus, getting 
my ticket, and spending two hours on the journey each way. The warden 
went on talking, but I didn't pay much attention. (4) 
ExemplifIed here are Meursault's pettiness and selfIshness. Meursault's world is 
so small that he resents the inconvenience of attending his own mother's funeral. One can 
imagine his wondering why his mother couldn't have died at a more convenient time. 
When Meursault and his mother's friends are en route to the graveside, the driver of the 
hearse initiates a conversation with Meursault. It is noteworthy that Meursault almost 
never initiates conversation. His reticence is another indication of his self-imposed exile 
from others and the world. He seems to have chosen the safety of seclusion over the risk 
inherent in loving. 
More important than his self-imposed exile, however, is Meursault's almost 
complete obliviousness of the most basic facts of his mother's life. The novel does not 
contain any dialogue between mother and son; this is signifIcant because it is another 
example of how disconnected Meursault is even with his closest relative (his father is 
never mentioned). 
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In his rare conversations, Meursault's goal is brevity followed by silence. Upon 
returning from his mother's funeral Meursault goes to bed. After waking, he is at a loss 
for what to do, so he decides to go for a swim (23). While swirnrning~ he recognizes a 
young girl narned Marie who is a former co-worker. They swim flirtatiously together for 
a while and she returns to his flat where he seduces her. Camus concludes the scene when 
Meursault wakes up: 
When I woke up, Marie had gone. She'd told me her aunt expected her 
first thing in the morning. I remembered it was Sunday, and that put me 
off; I've never cared for Sundays. So I turned my head and lazily sniffed 
the smell of brine that Marie's head had left on the pillow. I slept until ten. 
After that I stayed in bed until noon, smoking cigarettes. I decided not to 
lunch at Celeste's restaurant as I usually did; they'd be sure to pester me 
with questions, and I dislike being questioned. So I fried some eggs and 
ate them off the pan. I did without bread as there wasn't any left, and I 
couldn't be bothered going down to buy it. (25) 
While spending the remainder of the afternoon alone, Meursault distracts himself 
by watching people from the balcony of his apartment. Boys and girls spill out from the 
movie theatre; parents and their children stroll languidly down the streets; meanwhile, 
Meursault observes from his flat overlooking the scene. Weary of watching, he decides to 
reenter his apartment, and he thinks to himself, "It occurred to me that somehow I had got 
through another Sunday, that Mother now was buried, and tomorrow I'd be going back to 
work as usual. Really, nothing in my life had changed" (30). Nothing had changed? 
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Indeed, here is a man that has so distanced himself emotionally from others and the world 
that he is scarcely affected by the death of his mother; it casts no pall over his disposition. 
He maintains his routine and merely speculates about his next day's work at his 
employer's business. To borrow Faulkner's phrase from his Nobel Prize Speech, it is as if 
Meursault is a witness to ''the end of Man" and he is apathetic. Camus' philosophy is 
ultimately one of despair and this despair colors his portrayal of Meursault. 
In his exegesis of The Stranger in "The New Nihilism and The Novel," Norman 
Podhoretz writes: 
Reading Camus is like watching a man plunge over a precipice and then 
grab the edge of the cliff with his nails and hold on by God knows what 
miraculous instinct to survive. It hardly matters that this instinct is 
inarticulate, that Camus's solutions (submitting to the knowledge of the 
predicament, sharing the burdens of the oppressed) are no solutions-or at 
least nothing more than individual solutions. What matters is that he has 
looked upon the face of death and lived, that he has visited chaos and 
returned with the message that all we can do is try to think our way back 
into a world of meaning, to create a new world of meaning that makes no 
concession to the bankrupt philosophies of church or state. (52) 
What Podhoretz doesn't say in his critique of Camus' philosophy is where or how 
a "new world of meaning that makes no concession to the bankrupt philosophies of 
church or state" can be found. Is one world as good as another? What is the criterion for 
jUdging what one's "new world of meaning" should be? It is my contention that 
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Podhoretz's criticism of Camus' hero reveals Podhoretz' philosophy of pragmatism and 
not that he has any hope of discovering what is true. In his characterization of Meursault 
as a modern day everyman, "All we can do" implies that perhaps Podhoretz assumes 
there is no answer other than a subjective practicality. That is, your choice is just as good 
as mine. In short, this is the philosophy of moral relativism. I do think: Podhoretz is 
correct in recognizing that Camus' philosophy, as personified in Meursault, results in 
moral relativism. More importantly, however, is the fact that moral relativism is not an 
answer to man's alienation and sense oflostness; it is yet another effort by man to be the 
god of God rather than admitting his need for a Savior. For Meursault (and Camus). man 
can redeem himself via rebellion. The problem, however, is that Camus cannot provide 
any non-subjective reason for one to rebel or not to rebel. His philosophy does not speak 
to the "ought." 
In "Stranger in Paradise," John Weightman compares The Stranger to other 
French existentialists and comes closer than Podhoretz to explaining the despair that 
Meursault experiences. Rather than despair being "a way" as Podhoretz suggests, 
Weightman argues that Meursault's experience reveals a metaphysical nihilism. 
Weightman writes: 
Meursault is ... fleetingly aware of [ a] theme that is implicit in Gide, 
Malraux, and Montherlant, but never clearly isolated by them: this the 
Absurd, the gap or uncertain connection between the consciousness and all 
phenomena, whether pleasurable or unpleasurable. (99) 
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Weightman adds, "the Absurdist awareness of the absence of any settled moral 
truth is worked into all the details of the story." (99) What Weightman recognizes is the 
"gap" that exists between Meursault and the world. Epistemologically speaking, there is a 
disconnect between his individual consciousness and phenomena insofar as meaning is 
concerned. Meursault's apparent apathy is a natural mood given the absurdity of his 
world. As Camus himself writes in The Myth of Sisyphus: 
Writing in images rather than in reasoned arguments, [they are] convinced 
of the uselessness of any principle of explanation and sure of the educative 
message of perceptual appearance . . .. The work of art ... is the outcome 
of an often unexpressed philosophy, its illustration and consummation. 
But it is complete only through the implications of that philosophy. (75) 
Meursault's philosophical worldview is clear here. It is only through one's 
"refusal to give in" that a person's worth or nobility or character may be established. The 
universe is impersonal and it is up to each person to construct his own meaning; meaning 
is in no way inherent or essential. The conviction with which one acts is what is most 
important. As Sprintzen writes of Camus' philosophy: 
References to unity suggest the need to feel that life is the expression of an 
overriding purpose that gives direction to daily activity, thus saving it and 
releasing us from the insignificance that would otherwise follow from the 
inevitability of our death. (59) 
Here Sprintzen has put his finger on the crux of the problem. Camus' protagonist 
seeks to find meaning in his life; but how can he do this in a world devoid of a 
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transcendent and personal creator? Can an individual's actions have any real, significant, 
infinite meaning in a universe without God? These questions go to the heart of the matter. 
They bring questions of metaphysics and ultimate reality into existential experience 
wherein philosophical ideas manifest themselves in human flesh and blood. Philosophy is 
not reserved for academia but filters its way down into the lives of ordinary people who 
love, suffer, rejoice, yearn, long, hope, and die. 
About a third of the way through The Stranger Meursault is offered a change in 
job responsibilities that would allow him to live in Paris and travel through France 
several months during each year. Moreover, Meursault is asked by Marie if he will marry 
her. The philosophical underpinnings of the following passage from The Stranger reveal 
much of Camus' ideas: 
He then asked if a "change oflife," as he called it, didn't appeal to me, 
and I answered that one never changed his way of life; one life was as 
good as another, and my present one suited me quite well. 
At this he looked rather hurt, and told me that I always shilly-shallied, 
and that I lacked ambition-a grave defect, to his mind, when one was in 
business. 
I returned to my work. I'd have preferred not to vex him, but I saw no 
reason for "changing my life." By and large it wasn't an unpleasant one. 
As a student I'd had plenty of ambition of the kind he meant. But, when I 
had to drop my studies, I very soon realized all that was pretty futile. 
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Marie came that evening and asked me if I'd marry her. I said I didn't 
mind; if she was keen on it, we'd get married. Then she asked me again if 
I loved her. I replied, much as before, that her question meant nothing or 
next to nothing-but I supposed I didn't. 
"If that's how you feel," she said, "why marry me?" 
I explained that it had no importance really, but, if it would give her 
pleasure, we could get married right away. I pointed out that, anyhow, the 
suggestion came from her; as for me, I'd merely said, "Yes." (52-53) 
This passage illustrates the "great divorce" (C.S. Lewis' term) that Meursault has 
experienced. That is, there is a total disconnect between existence and meaning/purpose 
for him. He does not seem to feel qualitatively different from the animal world. None of 
his actions will resonate after he has passed away because he does not believe himself to 
be significant, let alone, inherently valuable or sacred. When Meursault is asked ifhe felt 
grief on the "sad occasion" of his mother's death, he recounts: 
I answered that, of recent years, I'd rather lost the habit of noting my 
feelings, and hardly knew what to answer. I could truthfully say I'd been 
quite fond of mother-but real1y that didn't mean much. All normal 
people, I added as an afterthought, had more or less desired the death of 
those they loved, at some time or another. (80) 
For Meursault, location is unimportant because of the tenuousness of his 
connections to other people. He is noncommittal towards his work, his lover Marie, and 
his mother. This noncommittal characteristic ends abruptly, however, when Meursault 
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becomes involved in the struggles of his neighbor Raymond, a fellow tenant of the 
apartment complex where Meursault lives. Raymond invites his friend Masson and 
Meursault to go for a walk on the beach. It becomes obvious to Meursault as they walk 
that Raymond has another agenda; namely, he wants to fight some local Arabs (the novel 
is set in Algeria) with whom he had fought before: 
At the end of the beach we came to a small stream that had cut a 
channel in the sand, after coming out from behind a biggish rock. There 
we found our two Arabs again, lying on the sand in their blue dungarees. 
They looked harmless enough, as if they didn't bear any malice, and 
neither made any move when we approached. The man who slashed 
Raymond stared at him without speaking. The other man was blowing 
down a little reed and extracting from it three notes of the scale, which he 
played over and over again, while he watched us from the comer of an 
eye. 
For a while nobody moved; it was' all sunlight and silence except for 
the tinkle of the stream and those three little lonely sounds. Then 
Raymond put his hand to his revolver pocket, but the Arabs still didn't 
move. I noticed the man playing on the reed had his big toes splayed out 
almost at right angles to his feet. (70-71) 
Still bitter from his earlier struggle with the Arabs, Raymond is intent upon 
revenge. While holding a pistol Raymond has given him, Meursault thinks to himself, 
"And just then it crossed my mind that one might fire, or not fire-and it would come to 
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absolutely the same thing" (72). Then it happens; Meursault fires five times into the body 
of one of the Arab men killing him instantly. I think that Meursault's thought about the 
consequence of murder coming ''to absolutely the same thing" illustrates his belief that 
life is absurd. If this is the rebellion that Camus writes of, it is not noble. Meursault's 
actions are almost surreal. 
The Stranger concludes with Meursault being visited by a Catholic priest. The 
priest asks Meursault if he will repent of his sin and accept Christ's atonement: 
I told him that I wasn't conscious of any "sin"; all I knew was that I'd 
been guilty of a criminal offense. Well, I was paying the penalty of that 
offense, and no one had the right to expect anything more from me. (148) 
Meursault rejects the offer-the gift-of salvation. He thinks to himself, 
''Nothing, nothing had the least importance, and I know quite well why" (152). Meursault 
is then sentenced to be executed for the crime of murder. As the novel concludes, 
Meursault has one last desire: "For all to be accomplished, for me to feel less lonely, all 
that remained to hope was that on the day of my execution there should be a huge crowd 
of spectators and that they should greet me with howls of execration." (154) 
It could be argued that Camus attempts to sanctify individual choice in a world 
that is neither sacred nor profane. If Meursault really believes that "nothing had the least 
importance," is it not, then, fair to say that his actions don't matter either? Meursault's 
motive for murdering the Arab is just as meaningless as his whole life has been up to that 
point. In his world of estrangement, there is no reason not to murder since his life is only 
the sum of his choices. Like Dostoyevsky's Grand Inquisitor, Meursault feels that if God 
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is dead, then all is permissible. Since there is no moral law-giver, there is no moral law. 
Since there is no moral law, his murdering the Arab is not inherently "wrong" because he 
has already ruled out the possibility of right and wrong in denying the existence of God. 
Camus' character has ruled out the possibility of ethical absolutes and in so doing he has 
nullified his own value as an individual. The death of absolutes leads inexorably to the 
loss of justifiable values. In his book He Is There and He Is Not Silent, Francis Schaeffer 
offers this analysis of Camus' position: "He argued that if there is a God, then we cannot 
fight social evil, for if we do, we are fighting God who made the world as it is" (296). I 
think Schaeffer's statement is a fair assessment of Camus' portrayal of Meursault in The 
Stranger because the novel dramatizes the bankruptcy of atheistic existentialism to 
explain meaninglessness. As a novel, The Stranger has few equals in terms of its power 
to elicit pity for its despairing anti-hero; but as an answer to man's Iostness and search for 
meaning, it fails to offer even solace, much less any answers. Given Meursault's rejection 
of God, I don't think an answer to meaninglessness is even possible. 
Chapter II 
Existential Hell in Sartre's No Exit 
Jean-Paul Sartre's name (1905-80) usually evokes images of the philosopher 
sitting at a Parisian cafe amid a throng of devotees. Ironically, this incredibly popular 
philosopher, essayist, novelist, and playwright penned the phrase "Hell is other people" 
in his play No Exit Like his contemporary Camus, Sartre grapples with how meaning in 
life can be explained philosophically in a world where God has, philosophically at least, 
died. Like Camus' Meursault, Sartre's characters face the dilemma of trying to establish 
the ought in morality without the anchor of a necessary being, or the is, or God. In The 
Tragic Protest David Anderson writes: 
The difficulty is that Sartre, like all morally serious writers, is concerned 
not only with what men do but also with what they ought to do, not only 
with how they actually understand themselves but with how they ought to 
understand themselves. He wants to break down all the bogus structures, 
to strip off the layers of falsehood and self-deception, and to reveal the 
authentic being of man. But this implies a theory about the nature of 
"authentic" being which itself stands in need of some authentication. For 
the most part, Sartre's writings attempt to provide this negatively, by 
presenting to us a pageant of individuals who are manifestly living 
inauthentically and by leaving us to infer from their failure the lines along 
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which we are to look for success. This makes his novels and plays on the 
whole rather depressing and even inhuman .... (15) 
In No Exit, as in all ofSartre's other plays and novels, the characters exist in a 
world without God. Thus situated, they struggle to find or create meaning in their lives 
through their actions. In Sartrean existentialism, as in Camus', the individual's choices 
are the only measure of one's worth. Whether one acts honestly or dishonestly is 
ultimately unimportant; what matters is only that he acts. In The Stranger, it is not 
important that Meursault commits a senseless and absurd murder; it is important, 
however, that he authenticates himself by accepting the consequence (death) of 
murdering. In other words, one's existence precedes one's essence, and it is by choosing 
that one creates his character. The character created cannot, however, be compared with 
God in Sartre's philosophy since he is avowedly atheistic. As David Anderson writes: 
There is, therefore, a sense in which Sartre and other contemporary writers 
are creative and open to the future because it is free from stultifying moral 
prescriptions. The difference is that Sartre believes that such a life can be 
self-generated, whereas Jesus believed it could come only if a man opened 
himself up to the will of God. (90) 
According to Sartre, then, one's meaning is created, not discovered. Meaning is 
not essential or in any way inherent; rather it is conferred through the subjective choice 
of the individual. Sartre denies the moral law or natural law that Christianity posits. In To 
Everyone An Answer Francis J. Beckwith explains how Christianity is unique in its 
claims and how and why the moral law exists: 
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Fim there exists an eternally self-existing moral agent named God, 
who created the universe ex nihilo. The universe is completely and 
absolutely contingent upon God for its beginning as well as its continued 
existence. He is, among other things, personal, omnipotent, omniscient, 
omnipresent, perfectly good, necessary and inftnitely wise. God is not 
only the Creator of the visible and physical universe but also the source of 
the invisible and nonphysical one. He is the creator of human souls and the 
ontological source of the moral law, logic, and mathematics. (14) 
It is, then, the moral law and God's existence which Sartre questions. He 
dramatizes the consequences of living without the moral law. Because Sartrean 
existentialism posits that one's existence precedes his essence, freedom is the noblest 
virtue. The curtailment or dissolution of one's freedom is, therefore, the vilest offense. 
Any limit of one's freedom becomes an enemy. In No Exit, however, Sartre's characters 
exist in hell because of their denial of absolutes in the realm of ethics. If there is any 
absolute, it is that one is free and the individual "ought" to avoid any infringement upon 
absolute freedom. In Deliver Us From Evil, Ravi Zacharias explains absolutes and what 
the denial of them means in the ethical realm: 
An absolute is basically an unchanging point of reference by which all 
other changes are measured. Each discipline brings with it a handful of 
certainties by which others are developed. Those certainties, if assumed, 
must be previously demonstrated when used as absolutes. In contrast, 
relativism in ethics denounces absolutes and erects an indefensible system 
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that leaves all morality at the mercy of individual whim. Relativism is, 
therefore, only another word for anarchy, and that is why truth itself 
becomes elusive when there is no longer a point of reference. (219) 
In No Exit, the three characters' hell is dramatized by their efforts to ~'fix" others 
into a position where their absolute freedom is denied; the hell that results comes when 
they recognize the futility of trying to change, or in some way, limit the other characters. 
The setting for Hell in the play is a drawing room. There are only four characters, 
and one of these, Valet, only appears when the other three enter or exit the drawing room. 
As the play opens, Valet escorts Garcin, a middle-aged, pacifist journalist from Brazil 
into the room. One of the fIrst things Garcin notices is that there are no mirrors or 
windows; in fact, the room is dark and dreary. Garcin hungers for feedback from others, 
but only on his terms: 
Garcin: No windows. Only to be expected. And nothing breakable. But, 
damn it all, they might have left me my toothbrush! 
Valet: That's good. So you haven't yet got over your--what-do-you-call-
it?--sense of human dignity? Excuse me smiling. 
Garcin: I'll ask you to be more polite. I quite realize the position I'm in, 
but I won't tolerate .... (4) 
This longing for amenities (toothbrush and mirrors) and companionship is thematically 
important because it reveals the utter self-absorption of Garcin. As Valet rebuffs Garcin 
for being hurt by the paucity of amenities, Garcin says: "Yes, of course you're right. And 
why should one want to see oneself in a looking-glass?" (4) This remarl4 ironically, 
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foreshadows how Garcin will be "looked at" by the other two denizens of Hell; they will 
be his looking-glass and he will see himself through their eyes. Even before Valet turns to 
go away, Garcin cannot help but wound his escort with several barbed comments: "That 
is why there's something so beastly, so damn bad-manner~ in the way you stare at me. 
They're paralyzed." (5) This theme of paralysis, of being "fixed" or frozen into position 
pervades each scene of the play. It is another example of how people become "hell" to 
one another. The whole setting-a drawing room, scarcely lit, decorated with only three 
couches, no mirrors or even toothbrushes, etc.-is one of containment and deprivation. 
The only luxury the three characters have, ironically, is each other's company. As readers 
begin to realize this, the drawing room itself should fade in importance. Instead, the three 
characters' conflicts with each other become the instruments of torture. Critic John 
Mason Brown describes the hellishness of the play: 
The first misery suffered in his House of the Dead is claustrophobia. Hell, 
says one of his characters, is other people. It is also ourselves, because. in 
spite of what [M. Sartre] may preach as an Existentialist, as a dramatist he 
holds individuals accountable for their own doom. His hell is likewise the 
fearsome fate of being compelled to live with two other unbearable 
persons in a small windowless room. Not only this, but also of seeking 
help in vain from these companions, and then being engulfed allover 
again in the same pattern of repeated meanness. (211) 
In addition to Hell's claustrophobia, Garcin, Inez, and Estelle (the three main 
characters) begin to irritate each other early on in the play. Garcin confesses to being a 
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coward in life, and Inez professes that she is a lesbian; Estelle (an avowed 
nymphomaniac) feels trapped in the middle of a sexual struggle (16-17). Each character~ s 
pettiness emerges: 
Inez: What's the point of play-acting, trying to throw dust in each 
other's eyes? We're all tarred with the same brush. 
Estelle: How dare you! 
Inez: In hell! Damned souls-that's us, all three! 
Estelle: Keep quiet! I forbid you to use such disgusting words. 
Inez: A damned soul-that's you, my little plaster saint. And ditto our 
friend there, the noble pacifist. We've had our hour of pleasure, haven't 
we? There have been people who burned their lives out for our sakes-and 
we chuckled over it. So now we have to pay the reckoning. 
Garcin: Will you keep your mouth shut, damn it! 
Inez: All. I understand now. I know why they~ve put us three together. 
Garcin:I advise you to--to think twice before you say any more. 
Inez: Wait! You~ll see how simple it is. Childishly simple. Obviously 
there aren't any physical torments-you agree, don't you? And yet we're 
in hell. And no one else will come here. We'll stay in this room together, 
the three of us, forever and ever .... In short, there's someone absent 
here, the official torturer. (17) 
What strikes the reader most about the three characters is their pettiness and self-
centeredness. They are, ironically, determined to be free; their desires for autonomy at 
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any cost soon begin to clash with the others' equally selfish agendas. The result is that 
Hell becomes other people. In The Theatre of Jean-Paul Sartre, Dorothy McCall writes: 
"Hell is-other people" is the central truth of No Exit. Within the play, it 
serves as a summing up of what has been dramatically revealed to us by 
the interaction of its three characters. It is important to remember, 
however, that within Sartre's philosophy that formula has a limited and 
specific meaning. Sartre has emphasized this point: "The only valid 
relationship is with other people. That can go even to hell. In order for it 
not to be hell,praxis must exist. The characters of No Exit are in a 
passive, changeless situation in which each of them is inevitably fixed in 
his essence by the others." Hell, then, is other people when they brand us 
with an image we cannot bear to accept as our own, and when we have no 
possibility to act so as to change that image. (124) 
The competitiveness between the three characters is inevitable due to the absence 
of the ethical ought. Garcin shouts to Inez, "Will you keep your mouth shut, damn it!" 
because he realizes that only competition can exist for them in this relationship. 
Philosopher Francis Schaeffer clarifies the problems that arise in ethics when one 
disavows transcendent m~g: 
He [Sartre] held that in the area of reason everything is absurd, but 
nonetheless a person can authenticate himselfby an act of the will; 
everyone should abandon the pose of spectator and act in a purposeless 
world. But because, as Sartre saw it, reason is separated from this 
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authenticating, the will can act in any direction. On the basis of his 
teaching, you could authenticate yourself either by helping a poor old lady 
along the road at night or by speeding up your auto and running her down. 
Reason is not involved, and nothing can show you the direction which 
your will should take. (167) 
It is no wonder, then, Garcin shouts to Inez and Estelle as the play concludes that 
"Hell is--other people!" No alternatives exist when the moral law, the ought, is removed 
from the realm of ethics. There is no reason to "love thy neighbor as thyself." Instead, a 
kind of situation ethics enters wherein human interaction resembles not so much mutual 
benefit as paranoia. In Sartre's philosophical tome Being and Nothingness, he grapples 
with this tension and despair and why he thinks hell is inevitably other people: 
This freedom chooses then not to recover itself but to flee itself, not to 
coincide with itself but to be always at a distance from itself. What are we 
to understand by this being which wills to hold itself in awe, to be at a 
distance from itself? Is it a question of bad faith or of another fundamental 
attitude? And can one live this new aspect of being? In particular will 
freedom by taking itself for an end escape all situation? Or will it situate 
itself so much the more precisely and the more individually as it projects 
itself further in anguish as a conditioned freedom and accepts more fully 
its responsibility as an existent by whom the world comes into being? All 
these questions, which refer us to a pure and not an accessory reflection, 
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can find their reply only on the ethical plane. We shall devote to them a 
future work. (798) 
It is telling that Sartre never produced his promised book on ethics. 
Chapter III 
Percy's The Moviegoer: A Christian Alternative to Existential Despair 
Walker Percy's The Moviegoer takes up where the writings of Camus and Sartre 
leave us. The intellectual roads for Camus end in stoicism at best or despair, futility, and 
nihilism at worst. Camus claims that suicide is the fundamental philosophical problem. 
Nonetheless, Camus compares Universal Man's struggles with those of Sisyphus wherein 
each man is "condemned" to live a life of frustration. For Sartre, man's freedom is both 
his glory and his tragedy. Sartre claims that man's existence precedes his essence. A 
person's character is formed solely on the basis of his choices. The logical outworking of 
this assumption leads his most famous literary creation, Garcin from No Exit, to declare 
that "Hell is-other people." In his book Intellectuals, Paul Johnson describes Sartrean 
existentialism this way: "In essence it was a philosophy of action, arguing that man's 
character and significance are determined by his actions, not his views, by his deeds, not 
words" (229-230). Johnson continues his exegesis ofSartre's thought from an historical 
perspective (No Exit debuted in Paris in 1944): 
Sartre used his new philosophy to offer an alternative: not a church or a 
party but a challenging doctrine of individualism in which each human 
being is seen as absolute master of his soul ifhe chooses to follow the path 
of action and courage. It was a message of liberty after the totalitarian 
nightmare. (231) 
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This idea of each individual being "master of his soul" is where Percy's thought 
enters this intellectual scene, but his conclusions regarding existential angst and the 
nature of human relationships starkly contrast with those of Camus and Sartre. The 
Moviegoer is the story of a single, 30-something year old man named Binx Bolling, a 
stock and bond tradesman, living in Gentilly, a suburb of contemporary New Orleans. 
Like Camus' Meursault from The Stranger, Binx is alienated. Even the opening of The 
Moviegoer resembles the opening of Camus' The Stranger in the way in which the author 
portrays his lonely protagonist: 
This morning I got a note from my aunt asking me to come for lunch. I 
know what this means. Since I go there every Sunday for dinner and today 
is Wednesday, it can mean only one thing: she wants to have one of her 
serious talks. It will be extremely grave, either a piece of bad news about 
her stepdaughter Kate or else a serious talk about me, about the future and 
what I ought to do. It is enough to scare the wits out of anyone, yet I 
confess I do not find the prospect altogether unpleasant. (3) 
From the opening of the novel, we learn that Binx is somehow different from 
almost everyone else. He is the topic of "talks" with his aunt. Percy seems to suggest that 
Binx is somehow not privy to something which most other people know. Binx has few if 
any friends and he occupies his free time by going to movies and seducing various 
women. In both novels, women serve as distractions from the malaise that plagues both 
men. In the early pages ofthe novel, Binx describes one of his outings: 
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On these occasions Linda becomes as exalted as I am now. Her eyes 
glow, her lips become moist, and when we dance she brushes her fine long 
legs against mine. She actually loves me at these times--and not as a 
reward for being taken to the Blue Room. She loves me because she feels 
exalted in this romantic place and not in a movie out in the sticks. 
But all this is history. Linda and I have parted company. I have a new 
secretary, a girl named Sharon Kincaid. (5) In the example above, Binx is 
the consummate observer. He watches Linda and hypothesizes about their 
relationship. While Binx occupies his time with these women and movie-
going, something causes him to come to grips with his shallow existence. 
He senses his emptiness even while in the relationship with Linda and 
longs for a metaphysical grounding for this emptiness. He terms it his 
"search": 
What is the nature of the search? you ask. 
Really it is very simple, at least for a fellow like me; so simple that it 
is easily overlooked. 
The search is what anyone would undertake if he were not sunk in the 
everydayness of his own life. This morning, for example, I felt as if I had 
come to myself on a strange island. And what does such a castaway do? 
Why, he pokes around the neighborhood and he doesn't miss a trick. 
To become aware of the possibility of the search is to be onto 
something. Not to be onto something is to be in despair. 
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The movies are onto the search, but they screw it up. The search 
always ends in despair. They like to show a fellow coming to himself in a 
strange place-but what does he do? He takes up with the local librarian, 
sets about proving to the local children what a nice fellow he is, and settles 
down with a vengeance. In two weeks time he is so sunk in everydayness 
that he might just as well be dead. (13) 
This "everydayness" to which Binx refers is the enemy of his search. Prior to his search, 
Binx is all but unaware of his own shallowness. After realizing his own despair, he thinks 
"not to be onto something is to be in despair." One recalls Jesus' parable of the sower as 
recorded by the apostle Matthew: In them is fulfilled the prophecy of Isaiah: 'You will 
be ever hearing but never understanding; you will be ever seeing but never perceiving. 
For this people's heart has become calloused; they hardly hear with their ears, and they 
have closed their eyes. Otherwise they might see with their eyes, hear with their ears, 
understand with their hearts and turn, and I would heal them.' (Matthew13:14-15, NIV) 
Christ's reference to the manner in which people are "calloused" is akin to Binx's 
recognition of "everydayness" as the enemy of purpose and meaningfulness in his life. 
Binx describes, albeit sarcastically, his search: 
For, as everyone knows, the polls report that 98% of Americans 
believe in God and the remaining 2% are atheists and agnostics-which 
leaves not a single percentage point for a seeker. For myself, I enjoy 
answering polls as much as anyone and take pleasure in giving intelligent 
replies to all questions. 
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Truthfully, it is the fear of exposing my own ignorance which 
constrains me from mentioning the object of my search. For, to begin 
with, I cannot even answer this, the simplest and most basic of all 
questions: Am 1, in my search, a hundred miles ahead of my fellow 
Americans or a hundred miles behind them? That is to say: Have 98% of 
Americans already found what I seek or are they so sunk in everydayness 
that not even the possibility of a search has occurred to them? (14) 
When Binx poses the question of whether 98% of other Americans have found what he is 
searching for, it seems reasonable to assume that God is the answer to his search. God is 
the antidote to everydayness. Beliefin God, however, is not sufficient for Binx; 
everydayness can creep in. In The Sickness Unto Death, Kierkegaard writes, " ... the 
specific character of despair is precisely this: it is unaware of being despairH (18). 
"Everydayness" in The Moviegoer is just such despair. Percy's title, The Moviegoer, 
suggests at least two ideas: 1) that Binx (postmodem man) is the moviegoer (the 
observer) and 2) that actors "know" something that the observer doesn't. What Binx 
envies about movie stars is their "peculiar reality," he says (17). That is why Binx is a 
moviegoer. He wants to penetrate the movie stars' reality. He sees them as "fitting into" 
the world; they are not estranged from it the way he is. In the following excerpt, Binx is 
walking through New Orleans when he spots the movie star William Holden. Binx 
catalogues the effect Holden has on a young couple who are awed by the aura of the 
famous actor: 
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Now they spot Holden. The girl nudges her companion. The boy perks 
up for a second, but seeing Holden doesn't really help him. On the 
contrary. He can only contrast Holden's resplendent reality with his own 
shadowy and precarious existence. Obviously he is more miserable than 
ever. What a deal, he must be thinking, trailing along behind a movie 
star-we might just as well be rubbernecking in Hollywood. 
Holden slaps his pockets for a match. He has stopped behind some 
ladies looking at iron furniture on the sidewalk. They look like housewives 
from Hattiesburg come down for a day of shopping. He asks for a match; 
they shake their heads and then recognize him. There follows much 
blushing and confusion. But nobody can find a match for Holden. By now 
the couple have caught up with him. The boy holds out a light, nods 
briefly to Holden's thanks, then passes on without a flicker of recognition. 
Holden walks along between them for a second; he and the boy talk 
briefly, look up at the sky, shake their heads. Holden gives them a pat on 
the shoulder and moves on ahead. 
The boy has done it! He has won title to his own existence, as plenary 
an existence now as Holden's, by refusing to be stampeded like the ladies 
from Hattiesburg. He is a citizen like Holden; two men of the world they 
are. All at once the world is open to him. Nobody threatens from patio and 
alley. His girl is open to him too. He puts his arm around her neck, 
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noodles her head. She feels the difference too. She had not known what 
was wrong nor how it was righted but she knows now that all is well. 
Holden has turned down Toulouse shedding light as he goes. An aura 
of heightened reality moves with him and all who fall within it feel it. 
Now everyone is aware of him. He creates a regular eddy among the 
tourists and barkeeps and B-girls who come running to the doors of the 
joints. 
I am attracted to movie stars but not for the usual reasons. I have no 
desire to speak to Holden or get his autograph. It is their peculiar reality 
which astounds me. (15-16) 
The "peculiar reality" the movie stars possess is nothing more than the ease with 
which they exist in this non-world. Life is a script and the lines come naturally to them. 
For Binx, other people are actors on the stage of life while he, an audience of one, 
critiques the actors' performances while remaining, at least theoretically, unaffected. Like 
Camus' Meursault in The Stranger, Binx is more the observer oflife than a participant in 
it. 
When Binx narrates that he is interested in movie stars "but not for the usual 
reasons," we begin to understand his worldview. He is a stock and bond salesman, but we 
learn very quickly that his heart is not in it. Binx resembles the proverbial scientist who is 
so involved in his work and theories that he has lost touch with reality. In the following 
passage, Binx describes the worldview he held until he realizes the possibility for a 
search: 
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Until recent years, I read only "fundamental" books, that is, key books on 
key subjects, such as War and Peace, the novel of novels; A Study of 
History, the solution of the problem of time; Schroedinger's What is Life?, 
Einstein's The Universe as I See It, and such. During those years, I stood 
outside the universe and sought to understand it. I lived in my room as an 
Anyone living Anywhere and read fundamental books and only for 
diversion took walks around the neighborhood and saw an occasional 
movie. Certainly it did not matter to me where I was when I read such a 
book as The Expanding Universe. The greatest success of this enterprise, 
which I call my vertical search, came one night when I sat in a hotel room 
in Birmingham and read a book called The Chemistry of Life. When I 
finished it, it seemed to me that the main goals of my search were reached 
or were in principle reachable whereupon I went out and saw a movie 
called It Happened One Night which was itself very good. A memorable 
night. The only difficulty was that though the universe had been disposed 
of, I myself was left over. There I lay in my hotel room with my search 
over yet still obliged to draw one breath and then the next. But now I have 
undertaken a different kind of search, a horizontal search. As a 
consequence, what takes place in my room is less important. What is 
important is what I shall find when I leave my room and wander in the 
neighborhood. Before, I wandered as a diversion. Now I wander seriously 
and sit and read as a diversion (69-70). 
46 
The above passage is one indication of the Christian worldview that begins to take 
shape in the novel.. The image of the cross is important because it points both vertically 
and horizontally. Percy uses the terms vertical and horizontal to describe Binx's search. 
These directions correspond to the cross of Christ in their significance. The vertical 
direction represents Man's first purpose to worship and serve God. The horizontal 
direction represents Man's second purpose to evangelize or spread the Gospel of Christ. 
Just as Christ's literal shape during his crucifixion was both vertical and horizontal, so 
Man's life is to be first vertical in his relationship to God, and then to be horizontal in his 
relationship to others. Properly understood, this image crystallizes Man's designed role-
first he is to know his relation to his creator. After worshiping God, Man then will know 
his proper relationship to others. 
Another clue to understanding Binx's worldview is to consider the ideas prevalent 
in his choice of reading. With the exception of Tolstoy's novel, the others are scientific or 
philosophical books on time, biology, and physics. Binx recounts that after he completed 
the reading of The Chemistry of Life, everything had been explained in life except 
himself (70). In other words, a purely naturalistic explanation of the universe posits the 
theory that everything in the universe evolved through a blind, purposeless process of 
time, plus matter, plus chance. Percy lampoons this idea by having Binx think that 
everything is explainable except his own individuality. 
In his biography Walker Percy: A Life, Patrick Samway offers this exegesis of 
Percy's objections to defining all of life's experiences in purely naturalistic terms: 
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For Walker, the sciences do not operate in a vacuum, and he wanted to 
demonstrate ways in which they should be more interconnected. He felt 
that "if Western man's sense of homelessness and loss of community is in 
part due to the fact that he feels himself a stranger to the method and data 
of his sciences, and especially to himself construed as a datum, then the 
issue is no longer academic." In particular, American psychiatry seemed 
indifferent to the themes developed by Kierkegaard and Marcel-
particularly the sickness of modern man and the sense of homeless ness 
that modern man has tried to transform into a happy place. Ironically, 
modem psychiatry, in Walker's view, was unable to take into account the 
predicament of modern man, since the social sciences in particular 
evaluate illness as a deviation from a biological norm. Fromm posited that 
guilt occurs when people feel that their lives are running through their 
hands like sand: "This is the age of anxiety because it is the age of the loss 
of self." (182) 
What Samway has explained here is central to understanding Binx' s search in The 
Moviegoer. More important, however, is how unique Percy is in his answer to modern 
man's lostness. In another of Percy's books, Love in the Ruins, Percy writes of the "dread 
chasm that has rent the soul of Western man ever since the famous philosopher Descartes 
ripped body loose from mind and turned the very soul into a ghost that haunts its own 
house" (181). What Percy suggests is that purely biological and naturalistic explanations 
of the universe leave man feeling like a "ghost in the machine." Rather than seeing man 
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as a cosmic accident, Percy is akin to Kierkegaard in his assertion that man is a pilgrim 
and a wayfarer. Kierkegaard said Hegel had explained everything in the world except 
what it means to be an individual man who has to live and die at a particular place and 
time. That is, individual men often become lost during philosophical abstractions. 
Hegel's dialectic of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis does not explain an individual's 
existential struggles in life. It is during this struggle to separate himself from the realm of 
theory that Binx begins his search. 
Percy was greatly influenced by Kierkegaard, and in him he found a kindred 
spirit. Kierkegaard addressed the concerns that Percy (and Binx by extension) faced when 
trying to come to grips with man's lostness. After revisiting some Kierkegaardian ideas, 
we will be more able to understand why the above scene from The Moviegoer wherein 
Binx begins to ''wander seriously" is central to understanding Percy's Christian answer to 
the lostness of man. In The Sickness Unto Death Kierkegaard starts out by showing how 
man is unique because he alone among creatures is filled with a sense of purpose; and if 
man longs for discovering his purpose, it is only because he has wandered from the One 
who designed each man's purpose---God Himself. Kierkegaard illustrates man's 
uniqueness among creatures in this passage from The Sickness Unto Death by addressing 
man's unique ability to despair: 
If one were to stick to the abstract notion of despair, without thinking of 
any concrete despairer, one might say that it is an immense advantage. The 
possibility of this sickness is man's advantage over the beast, and this 
advantage distinguishes him far more essentially than the erect posture, for 
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it implies the infinite erectness or loftiness of being spirit. The possibility 
of this sickness is man's advantage over the beast; to be sharply observant 
of this sickness constitutes the Christian's advantage over the natural man; 
to be healed of this sickness is the Christian's bliss. (147-148) 
Thus Kierkegaard affirms that there is a spirit of Man qua Man that differentiates 
him from everything else. To borrow the title from one of Mortimer Adler's books, there 
is a qualitative difference to man, and this makes all the difference indeed. Percy agrees 
with Kierkegaard in that despair is advantageous because it alerts man to the fact that he 
has lost something. Binx writes in one of his journal entries in The Moviegoer: "Explore 
connection between romanticism and scientific objectivity. Does a scientifically minded 
person become a romantic because he is a left-over from his own science?" (88). It could 
be argued that a fitting subtitle for The Moviegoer might read: "What Happens When an 
Individual's Theory Explains Everything in the Universe Except Its Author or His Reason 
for Theorizing." 
In his book The God Who Is There, Francis Schaeffer expressed this idea shared 
by both Kierkegaard and Percy: 
Man today seeks to deflect this tension by saying that he is no more 
than a machine. But ifhe were no more than a machine, he would find no 
difficulty in proceeding step by step down the line to the logical 
conclusion of his non-Christian presuppositions. Man is not a machine, 
however, even ifhe says he is. Suppose that a satellite were put into orbit 
around the earth with a camera that was able to photograph everything on 
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the world's surface. If this infonnation was then fed back to a giant 
computer that did not need programming, it might calculate that 
everything behaved mechanically. But the final observer is not a computer 
but the individual man. There is always one person in the room who 
does not allow everything to be seen as machine-like; it is myself, the 
observer, because I know myself. 
Christians must be careful at this place. Though the Bible says men are 
lost, it does not say they are nothing. When a man says he is a machine or 
nothing, he makes himselfless than the Bible's view of fallen man. (135) 
In the early parts of The Moviegoer, Binx is a victim of believing the philosophy of 
materialism. He acknowledges that after his theories of materialism failed to account for 
his unique reality, he knew that worldview was wrong. The measure of any worldview's 
claim to truth must be its correspondence to reality. Otherwise, it self-destructs. 
Percy addressed the problem-almost the temptation--of seeing man as less than 
a fallen creature whose heart is seeking his home in God. He traces the modem and 
postmodem tendency towards nihilism back to Kierkegaard. In his essay "Diagnosing 
the Modem Malaise," for example, Percy writes: 
But what are we to make of a man who is committed in the most 
radical sense to the proposition that truth is attainable by science and that 
emotional gratification is attainable by interacting With one's environment 
and at the highest level by the enjoyment of art? It seems that everything is 
settled for him. But something is wrong. He has settled everything except 
51 
what it is to live as an individual. He still has to get through an ordinary 
Wednesday afternoon. Such a man is something like the young man 
Kierkegaard described who was given the task of keeping busy all day and 
finished the task at noon. What does this man do with the rest of the day? 
the rest of his life? 
But my question and my discovery was this: if there is such a gap in 
the scientific view of the world, e.g., what it is to be an individual living in 
the United States in 1985, and if the scientist cannot address himself to 
this reality, who can? My discovery, of course, was that the novelist can, 
and most particularly the novelist. Oddly enough, it was the reading of 
two nineteenth-century writers, Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky, who 
convinced me that only the writer, the existentialist philosopher, or the 
novelist can explore this gap with all the passion and seriousness and 
expectation of discovery of, say, an Einstein who had discovered that 
Newtonian physics no longer works. (213) 
In The Stranger. Meursault was invited by the priest to make a confession of sin 
and a profession offaith in Christ's grace as sufficient for salvation. In No Exit, Sartre 
intentionally has a Hell but never posits the existence of a Heaven. His characters reject 
the very existence of God. As a result, they now seek to distract themselves by describing 
their wasted lives to each other. In Percy's novel however, Binx realizes that there is a 
calling to an objective reality. This call leads him out of the morass that a philosophical 
presupposition to naturalism earlier led him to. 
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One of the reasons for man's lostness as portrayed in modem and postmodem 
literature goes back to a philosophical commitment to naturalism or materialism. The 
terms are synonomous in their belief that all reality is ultimately material or substance. 
To speak of man's soul or oflove to a materialist is, therefore, preposterous. In To 
Everyone an Answer, J.P. Moreland describes the materialist or naturalist worldview: 
According to physicalism, a human being is merely a physical entity. The 
only things that exist are physical substances, properties, and events. The 
human, therefore, is a physical substance-namely, a material brain or 
body. This physical substance has physical properties--a certain weight, 
volume, size, electrical activity, chemical composition, and so forth. There 
are also physical events that occur in the brain. When someone has an 
occasion of pain or an occurrence of a thought, physicalists hold that these 
are merely physical events that can be exhaustively described in physical 
language. One's conscious mental life of thoughts, emotions, and pain is 
nothing but physical events in one's brain and nervous system. (226) 
The consequences of believing this philosophy are manifest in modem and 
postmodem literature. If man is nothing more than a construct of physical substances, all 
talk of a soul, purpose, meaning, lostness, God, and truth is nonsense. In fact, if there is 
nothing but physicalness and changing degrees of substance, there cannot be God (in the 
Christian tradition of a transcendent creator who is outside of His creation) or truth 
because truth, by its very nature, is unchanging and transcendent. 
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In their book I Don't Have Enough Faith to be an Atheist, authors Norm Geisler 
and Frank Turek offer many refutations of this philosophy of physicalism that pervades 
modern and postmodem literature: 
In 1859, Charles Darwin wrote, "If it could be demonstrated that any 
complex organ existed, which could not possibly have been formed by 
numerous, successive, slight modifications, my theory would absolutely 
break down." We know now that there are many organs, systems, and 
processes in life that fit that description. 
One of those is the cell. In Darwin's day the cell was a "black box"-a 
mysterious little part of life that no one could see into. But now that we 
have the ability to peer into the cell, we see that life at the molecular level 
is immeasurably more complex than Darwin ever dreamed. In fact, it is 
irreducibly complex. An irreducibly complex system is "composed of 
several well-matched, interacting parts that contribute to the basic 
function, wherein the removal of anyone of the parts causes the system to 
effectively cease functioning." (144-145) 
It is no wonder that the modem and postmodem novelist's world, after 
abandoning the Christian worldview, is lost and set adrift, as it were, in a cosmos he 
doesn't understand. In Percy's philosophical book Lost in the Cosmos, he describes 
modem man's predicament this way: The fact is that, by virtue of its peculiar 
relationship to the world, to others, and to its own organism, the autonomous self in a 
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modern technological society is possessed. It is possessed by the spirit of the erotic and 
the secret love of violence. 
The peculiar predicament of the present -day self surely came to pass as a 
consequence of the disappointment of the high expectations of the self as 
it entered the age of science and technology. Dazzled by the 
overwhelming credentials of science, the beauty and elegance of the 
scientific method, the triumph of modern medicine over physical ailments, 
and the technological transformation of the very world itself, the self finds 
itself in the end disappointed by the failure of science and technique in 
those very sectors of life which had been its main source of ordinary 
satisfaction in past ages. (178-179) 
This passage from Lost in the Cosmos may shed some light on why Binx begins 
his search after abandoning naturalistic philosophy. He realizes that the logical 
outworking of naturalistic philosophy is despair because it precludes the possibility of 
transcendence. This is why Binx, after reading The Chemistry of Life, feels "left over" 
(70). 
Where I think Percy differs from most others is in his assertion that only the 
Christian worldview explains man the way he really is-free, sinful, and in need of 
salvation. When other philosophies try to either deny man's freedom (behaviorism, 
positivism, Darwinism, etc.) try to deny objective morals (postmodernism) they all fail to 
account for man's inherent value. For Camus and Sartre, existence precedes essence. It is 
one's choices that determine a man's character. Moreover, no one choice is inherently 
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better or worse since God has died; and absolute values died with Him. Percy rejects this 
view in that he views man's essence as preceding his existence. Embodying a Christian 
world view, Percy believes that man is created in the image of God; therefore, each 
individual is intrinsically valuable because of the creation's imprint of God Himself. This 
is why Binx's search turns from vertical to horizontal. 
Percy is ironically equipped to diagnose the modem malaise since he was trained 
primarily as a physician. He even served in such a capacity until he contracted 
tuberculosis. As a physician, he was saturated with the materialist/naturalist worldview; 
namely, that the universe is explainable in purely naturalistic terms. The supernatural is 
excluded as a possible explanation for the universe from the outset. 
For the purposes of this paper, however, some measure of Christian theology 
should be kept in mind to better understand how Percy's ideas shape The Moviegoer. 
One indication in The Moviegoer of where Binx begins to turn from a materialist 
world view to a Christian one is seen when he begins to understand his own alienation. 
Binx is with his girlfriend Kate and he replays the afternoon they spend together: 
She refers to a phenomenon of moviegoing which I have called 
certification. Nowadays when a person lives somewhere, in a 
neighborhood, the place is not certified for him. More than likely he will 
live there sadly and the emptiness which is inside him will expand until it 
evacuates the entire neighborhood. But if he sees a movie which shows his 
very neighborhood, it becomes possible for him to live, for a time at least, 
as a person who is Somewhere and not Anywhere. (63) 
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After musing about people's hobbies,Binx thinks "As for hobbies, people with 
stimulating hobbies suffer from the most noxious of despairs since they are tranquilized 
in their despair. I must glide along as quietly as a ghost" (86). Binx is now coming to 
terms with his own exile by contrasting himself with others; at least he recognizes his 
despair. He knows enough to at least break out of his everydayness; his search will lead 
him somewhere or to someone. 
As an avid moviegoer, Binx has developed an observer's keen eye for watching 
people, and he thinks he sees something that many others don't; namely, that they are lost 
in their everydayness without realizing it. Binx is beginning to come to terms with his 
own alienation from others. Binx's search is leading out of darkness and existential 
solitude into light and relationships. 
Chapter IV 
The Horizontal Search as Exemplified in The Moviegoer 
Binx's search in The Moviegoer is leading him out of himself and into the world 
of others. When Paul addressed the Corinthians, he wrote: "Do not deceive yourselves. If 
anyone of you thinks he is wise by the standards of this age, he should become a 'fool' 
so that he may become wise. For the wisdom of this world is foolishness in God's sight. 
As it is written: 'He catches the wise in their craftiness'; and again, 'The Lord knows that 
the thoughts of the wise are futile.' So then, no more boasting about men!" (l Corinthians 
3:18-21). What Paul implores the Corinthians to admit is that nothing is responsible for 
man's lostness but sin-it is a rejection of God's manifestation in the person of Christ 
Jesus. God has given man more that enough reasons to believe. But man has chosen to 
become god himself rather than to submit to the first commandment that "You shall have 
no other gods before me" (Exodus 20:3). Was this not the way the serpent tempted 
Eve--with the promise that man shall become as god himself? In the Christian 
worldview, it is man's pride in himself that caused the original sin of disobeying God's 
command and, since then, all of creation has groaned: "For the creation was subjected to 
frustration, not by its own choice, but by the will of the one who subjected it, in hope that 
the creation itself will be liberated from its bondage to decay and brought into the 
glorious freedom of the children to God. We know that the whole creation has been 
groaning as in the pains of childbirth right up to the present time" (Romans 8:20-22). 
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This is what Paul tries to explain to the Philippians when he writes that Christ, "Who, 
being in very nature God, did not consider equality with God something to be grasped, 
but made himself nothing, taking the very nature of a servant, being made in human 
likeness. And being found in appearance as a man, he humbled himself and became 
obedient to death--even death on a cross!" (Philippians 2:6-8). Through most of The 
Moviegoer, Binx envied the ease with which moviestars fit themselves into the world. As 
the novel develops however, Binx sees that his envy has been unjustified. His search, he 
says, has become horizontal. Naturalistic explanations have failed to explain the 
mysteries of human behavior; distractions (women) have failed to satiate for very long; 
even movies have left him empty. As a last resort, his horizontal search parallels the 
Christian pilgrimage. 
There is no paucity of criticisms of God: Where was God on September 11,2001? 
How could God allow such suffering? What did those people who died do to deserve 
death? The questions probe the very heart of man. These questions are, however, very 
legitimate and deserve an answer. What often go unnoticed, however, are the 
assumptions and presuppositions of the questions themselves. For example, when 
someone asks "Where was God when .... " the questioner has assumed and invoked a 
moral standard by which to judge. He has assumed an objective moral standard by which 
and through which he condemns an act as unjust or unfair. How can one call something 
unjust or unfair unless he knows, or thinks he knows, what is fair? This is what Lewis 
called the law of nature or the moral law. Next, we expand upon the concept of the moral 
law and how Percy uses it in a distinctly Christian manner in The Moviegoer. 
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The moral law is a concept that people often assume in ethical debates though 
they may be unaware of it. In the opening of Mere Christianity, C.S. Lewis gives this 
famous example to explain the moral law. He describes a disagreement between people 
and how the moral law is invoked as a standard that has been violated: 
'That's my seat, I was there first'-'Leave him alone, he isn't doing you 
any harm'-'Why should you shove in first?,-'Give me a bit of your 
orange, I gave you a bit ofmine'-'Come on, you promised.' People say 
things like that every day, educated people as well as uneducated, and 
children as well as grown-ups. Now what interests me about all these 
remarks is that the man who makes them is not merely saying that the 
other man's behaviour does not happen to please him. He is appealing to 
some standard of behaviour which he expects the other man to know 
about. And the other man very seldom replies: 'To hell with your 
standard.' Nearly always he tries to make out that what he has been doing 
does not really go against the standard, or that if it does there is some 
special excuse. He pretends there is some special reason in this particular 
case why the person who took the seat first should not keep it, or that 
things were quite different when he was given the bit of orange, or that 
something has turned up which lets him off keeping his promise. It looks, 
in fact, very much as if both parties had in mind some kind of Law or Rule 
of fair play or decent behaviour or morality or whatever you like to call it, 
about which they really agreed. And they have. If they had not, they 
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might, of course, fight like animals, but they could not quarrel in the 
human sense of the word. Quarrelling means trying to show that the other 
man is in the wrong. And there would be no sense in trying to do that 
unless you and he had some sort of agreement as to what Right and Wrong 
are; just as there would be no sense in saying that a footballer had 
committed a foul unless there was some agreement about the rules of 
football. (3-4) 
In this passage, Lewis highlights how people can overlook the moral manner in 
which objections themselves are raised by invoking an absolute standard (the moral law). 
What Lewis deftly points out is that oftentimes people assume an absolute law or 
standard but don't want to admit the giver of that law. For Lewis, Percy, and other 
Christians, this moral lawgiver is God. Inside the Trinity there is complete unity in 
diversity; this is the quintessence that unifies all the others. What exists in perfect form in 
the trinity is relationship in its holy reality. 
In The Moviegoer, this concept of the moral law is illustrated when Binx 
undergoes the transformation from observer when he wrestles with purely materialistic 
explanations of life on the vertical plane to a participant when he commits to love his 
fellow man (Kate) on the horizontal plane. Binx rejects the materialistic explanation of 
the universe in light of the evidence that experience reveals to him; namely, that there are 
many experiences in life that cannot be explained by way of materialism. Binx goes from 
his life as a metaphysical leftover from the philosophy of materialism to a fellow 
journeyman (a wayfarer) who fmds his bearings only in relationship to another. This is 
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why The Moviegoer is a comic novel rather than a tragic one. Rather than remaining 
isolated like Camus' Meursault or Sartre's denizens in Hell, Binx marries his longtime 
girlfriend Kate. In one of the final scenes of the novel, Binx and Kate are on a bus and 
Binx notices a college-aged young man reading The Charterhouse of Parma. Binx, the 
former romantic, empathizes with the young man silently. He surmises what the young 
man's thoughts are like and why he might be reading the novel. What type of personality 
might the young man have? What is he longing for? What is the relationship between this 
young man's reading Stendahl and being alone in New Orleans during Mardi Gras? 
Having seen an earlier version of himself in this young man, Binx asks him how he likes 
the book. Percy writes thus of the exchange: 
Now he closes his book and stares hard at it as ifhe would, by dint of 
staring alone, tear from it its soul in a word. "It's--very good," he says at 
last and blushes. The poor fellow. He has just begun to suffer from it, this 
miserable trick the romantic plays upon himself: of setting just beyond his 
reach the very thing he prizes. For he prizes just such a meeting, the 
chance meeting with a chance friend on a chance bus, a friend he can talk 
to, unburden himself of some of his terrible longings. Now having 
encountered such a one, me, the rare bus mend, of course he strikes 
himself dumb. It is a case for direct questioning. (215) 
Binx then peppers him with a few run of the mill questions about what college he attends, 
his hometown, etc. The young man is so immersed in the romantic, movie-like quality of 
the novel that he invariably emulates the larger-than-life characters in the novel and fails 
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in his ability to converse with another person in the here and now. The young man is a 
victim of romanticism. He is a dreamer. He resembles the early Binx in that he is mired 
in the idea of romanticism and is missing out on the reality of an actual relationship. Just 
as Binx is a metaphysical leftover at the beginning of the story, so this fellow is a 
romantic whose search has not yet become horizontal. In this scene, Percy intimates that 
the young man on the bus is unaware of his despair. His "search" is still vertical; that 
explains why he retreats when Binx tries to establish a bridge of civility, a relationship, 
between them. Percy concludes the scene: "In fact, there is nothing more to say to him. 
The best one can do is deflate the pressure a bit, the terrible romantic pressure, and leave 
him alone. He is a moviegoer, though of course he does not go to movies." (216) 
What Percy elucidates here in his half-joking way is the tragedy that as a 
romantic, the young man longs for just such an encounter with a kindred spirit while on a 
bus ride in New Orleans; but because of his conviction that what he wants is always 
doomed to be just out of reach, he will be continually frustrated. How does the young 
man bridge this chasm? In typical Percy fashion, he leaves the question unanswered (at 
least in The Moviegoer). But he does have Binx reveal these words in an interior 
monologue: Is it possible that-For a long time I have secretly hoped for the end of the 
world and believed with Kate and my aunt and Sam Yerger and many other people that 
only after the end could the few who survive creep out of their holes and discover 
themselves to be themselves and live as merrily as children among the viny ruins. Is it 
possible that-it is not too late? (231) 
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In the above quote, Percy suggests that it is only in the realm of relationships, not 
theories, that meaning is discovered. Instead of Sartrean existentialism wherein Hell is 
other people, Percy sees honest relationships as the horizontal medium wherein meaning 
is found. In The Moviegoer, it takes Binx from reading books on chemistry and physics 
(theory) to marrying Kate (reality). 
Throughout The Moviegoer, Binx continues to attend the movies because they 
personify what it would mean to fit into the world without being plagued by self-
consciousness. In the scene where Binx sees William Holden in New Orleans, and the 
facades that the passers-by adopt to ingratiate themselves with the movie star, Binx is 
aware of the way Holden "gels" in the world. Holden, the actor, is the one who seems at 
ease but the "real people" seem embarrassed by the mundaneness of their lives. I think 
Percy is suggesting that everyone is acting to some extent but it is only through an honest 
relationship with another that any semblance of honor can truly be said to accompany the 
journey ofa wayfaring soul. This is why, I think, The Moviegoer ends with Binx 
committing to a relationship with his fiancee. Binx, unlike Camus' Meursault in The 
Stranger or Sartre's three characters being Hell to each other, finally relates to another in 
an "I-Thou" relationship. In "Walker Percy and the Self," Lewis Jerome Taylor, Jr. 
explains Percy's ideas this way: 
Existentialist that he is, Percy traces the problem of the times not to faulty 
societal or economic structures, but to failure of the individual. It is rooted 
essentially in the universal human tendency to take the easy way of 
floating on the tide of external influences and thereby forfeiting one's 
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sovereignty and the place on which one is given to stand. Because of this, 
a person becomes lost to himselfas a self, he lives outside of himself and 
does not know who he is. He is in despair, and the worst kind of despair is 
that which is so successfully covered up by diversion that one is hardly 
aware of it. (400) 
Taylor also recognizes Percy's Christian worldview when he writes: "Walker 
Percy is a Catholic who specifically asserts his belief in the Christian understanding of 
man and salvation. He also specifically acknowledges that he sees his mission as a writer 
as that of conveying the Christian truth to an age for which the traditional words have 
worn so smooth that they no longer take effect" (400). Percy sees individuals as fellow 
pilgrims created in the image of God and, therefore, intrinsically valuable. It is by 
recognizing this intrinsic value that relationship manifests itself in love as the supreme 
ethic. Love emerges in human relationships insofar as it resembles the perfect love that 
exists within the triune godhead. Though we are sinful because of original sin, we can be 
restored to fellowship with God (vertical plane) by accepting the gift of salvation through 
faith and grace, and then share that love with others (horizontal plane) and thereby 
emulate the supreme love that eternally exists in the triune godhead. 
In his essay "Diagnosing the Modem Malaise," Percy writes of the novelist's 
burden this way, and I think it can be applied to an exegesis of The Moviegoer insofar as 
it portends hope for modem man: 
The point is that, in a new age when things and people are devalued, when 
meanings break down, it lies within the province of the novelist to start the 
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search afresh, like Robinson Crusoe on his island. Tree bark may seem a 
humble place to start. But one must start somewhere. The novelist or poet 
in the future might be able to go further, to discover, or rediscover, not 
only how it is with tree bark but how it is with man himself, who he is, 
and how it is between him and other men. (221) 
Conclusion 
It has been my goal to show how Percy's view of man as evidenced in The 
Moviegoer and some of his nonfiction differs from the views of man as seen in Camus's 
The Stranger and Sartre's No Exit. The French existentialists assumed that God was 
dead. As stated by Ivan in Dostoyevsky's The Brothers Karamazov, if God is dead, then 
everything is permitted. The death of God means the death of absolutes. In the absence of 
moral absolutes, values are reduced to mere opinions. This is why Meursault in The 
Stranger found no ultimate value in living after murdering the Arab. He felt no remorse 
and he rejected the idea of God who promises forgiveness to those who earnestly admit 
their sin, ~lieve in the substitutionary death of Christ as the only infinite sacrifice 
sufficient to redeem mankind's sin, and confess belief in such. For Meursault did not 
believe in God, so any talk of sin was moot. There was no transcendent meaning and 
thus, there was no ultimate pwpose to his life. 
Sartre's characters in No Exit also believed in a world devoid ofa transcendent 
creator. Their actions were the only things that created their essence. What ultimate value 
could they have ascribed to their choices? Why should they have treated one another 
civilly rather than violently? Hence, they came to the only conclusion pennitted to ones 
with no belief in a transcendent and personal creator-Hell was other people. Anyone 
who interfered with one's own autonomy was at the least irritating and at worst torturous. 
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In Percy's The Moviegoer, however, the existence of the moral law manifests 
itself in the maturation of the protagonist Binx Bolling as he emerges from the angst of 
existential doubt caused by the feeling of being "left over" where naturalistic philosophy 
fails to explain the individual. Binx gets engaged in the existential sense and in the literal 
sense; he eventually marries and fulfills a role as a husband. He finds his completion only 
in the realm of a relationship. The triumph of Binx is that he realizes the bankruptcy of 
atheistic existentialism and/or naturalism to explain his plight. Why does Binx attend the 
movies? Ostensibly, it is because he enjoys them. What I think Percy suggests to us, 
however; is easily missed if we're too quick to judge. The world of the movies is fantasy. 
Percy uses Binx's movie-going as satire. What really matters most are the honest 
relationships that people create with one another. Just as the boy reading Stendahl on the 
bus was a tragic figure of one who is a victim of mental movie-going (i.e., attaching some 
reality to actors' lives that is not really there), so is much of the postmodem world if it 
thinks that it can redeem itself through endless subjectivity and distractions in a world 
devoid of transcendent meaning. Percy argues that both modernism and postmodernism 
fail to remedy modem man's malaise. 
Rather, those worldviews laugh at man through tear-stained eyes. In his essay, 
"Why Are You a Catholic?" Percy offers these winsome words: 
In the old Christendom, everyone was a Christian and hardly anyone 
thought twice about it. But in the present age the survivor of theory and 
consumption becomes a wayfarer in the desert, like St. Anthony; which is 
to say, open to signs. 
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I do not feel obliged to set forth the particular religious reasons for my 
choosing among the Jewish-Christian religions. There are times when it is 
better not to name God. One reason is that most of the denizens of the 
present age are too intoxicated by the theories and goods of the age to be 
aware of the catastrophe already upon us. (314) 
If postmodern man continues his tendency to devalue himself through naturalistic 
philosophy or the logical out-workings of atheistic existentialism or if he continues to 
distract himself and destroy the sacredness with which God created him, he makes 
himself, as Schaeffer said, less than the Bible's, and Percy's, view of fallen man. It is my 
contention that the works of Percy can serve as a canary in the coal mine that is the soul of 
modern man. 
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